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This chapter begins with a consideration of rival conceptions of learning and their 
relevance or otherwise for understanding learning at work. It is concluded that the most 
influential conceptualisation of learning, one that has decisively shaped formal 
education systems, is very problematic when it comes to understanding learning at 
work. The same difficulties occur for standard approaches to measuring attainment. In 
fact, it appears that ‘attainment’ is not a very helpful way of thinking about much 
workplace learning. The chapter then outlines some of the main features that distinguish 
learning at work from mainstream formal learning. To illustrate these points, a case 
history of learning at work in a rapidly changing field is presented. This shows how 
various contextual factors make learning in the workplace difficult to fit into standard 
ways of conceptualizing learning. It also points to some factors that can contribute to 
improving learning at work. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter argues that the most influential conceptualization of learning, one that has 
decisively shaped formal education systems, is very problematic when it comes to 
understanding learning and measuring learning at work.  In order to develop this 
argument, the chapter is organized in three main sections: conceptions of learning and 
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learning at work; measurement of attainment of learning at work; a case history of 




CONCEPTIONS OF LEARNING AND LEARNING AT WORK 
In recent work (Beckett and Hager 2002), two major understandings of learning have 
been compared and contrasted. The first is called the ‘standard paradigm of learning’ 
and the second the ‘emerging paradigm of learning’. 
 
The standard paradigm of learning 
This paradigm has been very influential. Educational thought has been dominated by a 
largely unquestioned assumption that the most valuable learning is of one particular 
kind. Other forms of learning have been evaluated by how well they approximate to this 
favoured ‘standard paradigm of learning’. Major assumptions that characterize the 
standard paradigm of learning (Beckett and Hager 2002) include, focus on mind, 
interiority, and transparency.  
 
First, with regard to ‘focus on mind’, the basic image for understanding learning is of an 
individual human mind steadily being stocked with ideas. The focus of learning as a 
process is on circumstances that favour the acquisition of ideas by minds. The focus of 
learning as a product is on the stock of accumulated ideas that constitute a well-
furnished mind, the structure of those ideas, and how various ideas relate to one another. 
By emphasizing mental learning as the most valuable form of learning, the standard 
paradigm shows its allegiance to mind/body dualistic understandings of human beings 
as inherited from classical Greek thought and from Descartes. The effect of elevating 
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mind over body as the centre of the most valuable kind of learning is to make learning 
an essentially solitary process, an individualistic even narcissistic process, where the 
learner becomes a spectator aloof from the world. 
 
Second, an essential ‘interiority’ is assigned to all mental events and activities. As 
Toulmin (1999: 56) notes, the standard paradigm of learning assumes that ‘.... the 
supposed interiority of mental life is an inescapable feature of the natural processes in 
our brain and central nervous system’. On this view, human sense organs are 
instruments that can add content to mental life, but are themselves part of the ‘outer’ 
world of the body, not of the ‘inner’ mental world. So the most valuable form of 
learning is focused on thinking (what minds do), rather than action in the world (what 
bodies do) (Winch 1998). As well, the contents of minds, such as concepts and 
propositions, belong in this separate world. Meanings of concepts are established via the 
activity of individual minds. Concepts in turn are combined in propositions that 
represent things and states of affairs in the world (Winch 1998). So the individual 
solitary mind becomes a spectator that is not itself in the world, but is able to represent 
the world to itself via propositions. Since this mind is in effect in a different, non-
physical world, the same is so for the propositions. Thus we get the notion of 
propositions as timeless universal entities.  
 
Likewise,  learning is a change in the contents of an individual mind, i.e. a change in 
beliefs. Knowledge is viewed as a particular kind of belief, viz. justified true belief. 
Since belief is a mental state or property, learning is a change of property of a person 
(mind). So to have acquired particular learning is for the mind to have the right 
properties. However, properties, like propositions have been regarded as universals, i.e. 
the same in each instance. Hence the notion of knowledge as universal, true propositions 
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is linked with the traditional focus of formal education. So much follows from the 
essential interiority of mental events. 
 
The third key assumption of the standard paradigm of learning is the ‘transparency’ of 
learning. As Winch points out: ‘It is natural for us to talk about learning as if we 
recognize that we have both a capacity to learn and a capacity to bring to mind what has 
been learned’ (1998: 19). The capacity ‘to bring to mind’ trades on the image of the 
mind as the home of clear and distinct ideas. If we have really learnt well, we will be 
able to bring the learning to mind. An inability to do so is a clear indicator that learning 
has been imperfect or unsuccessful. This also implies that for the standard paradigm of 
learning non-transparent learning is either an aberration or a second rate kind of 
learning, e.g. tacit knowledge, informal learning, etc. 
 
It follows from the three assumptions in combination that the best learning consists of 
abstract ideas (concepts or propositions) that are context independent (universal) and 
transparent to thought. This immediately places such learning in a dichotomous 
relationship with learning that has very different characteristics such as the learning of 
skills by apprentices, which is typically concrete (rather than abstract), context 
dependent (rather than context independent), and somewhat intuitive and tacit (rather 
than transparent). Learning with these characteristics is thereby consigned to second-rate 
status. 
 
To summarize, the main implications of the standard paradigm of learning are that: 
• the best learning resides in individual minds not bodies; 
• the best learning is propositional (true, false, more certain, less certain); 
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• the best learning can be expressed verbally and written down in books, etc.; 
• the acquisition of the best learning alters minds not bodies; 
• such learning can be applied via bodies to alter the external world; 
• the process and product of learning can be sharply distinguished; 
• the best learning is transparent to the mind. 
 
The standard paradigm of learning has strongly influenced academic processes 
concerning selection of learners, what is learnt, how it is learnt, and how learning is 
demonstrated. A later theme in this chapter is on assessment/progression methods, and 
how they clearly show the influence of the standard paradigm, through their emphasis 
on learning being demonstrated by individuals reproducing verbal or written 
propositions in appropriate combinations and in response to set questions in 
examinations and written assignments. Here the main focus is on universal, context free 
knowledge, with numbers and grading to quantify the amount of learning demonstrated. 
Of course, the emphasis on assessment of this kind has not been without its critics. 
These have singled out: its excessive individualism; its devaluation of non-propositional 
learning; and the focus on intellectual understanding to the neglect of its application. 
 
More broadly, the basic assumptions of the standard paradigm of learning have attracted 
significant criticisms (Beckett and Hager 2002). Some of the main ones are: first, 
assuming that the most valuable learning is mental sets up dichotomies and hierarchies 
that in turn have created intractable problems of their own. An example is the 
theory/practice account of workplace performance/practice. As long ago as 1949 Ryle 
pointed out the futility of this view which effectively seeks to reduce practice to theory.  
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Second, the standard paradigm offers no ‘convincing account of the relationship 
between “knowledge” as the possession of individuals and “knowledge” as the 
collective property of communities of ‘knowers”...’ (Toulmin 1999: 54). Likewise the 
assumption that meaning is established via individual minds creates the problem of 
accounting for collective knowledge (Toulmin 1999: 55). Third, the assumption that the 
most valuable learning is transparent has been challenged. For example, Winch (1998) 
argues that knowledge is largely dispositional in Rylean terms, thereby taking the central 
focus away from transparent propositions in minds. Likewise, there is the claim, taken 
up later in this chapter, that abilities or capacities are presupposed by other forms of 
learning (Passmore 1980, Winch 1998). 
 
Finally, because the notion of ‘judgement’ will be important in later discussion, its role 
according to the standard paradigm of learning will be considered briefly. The term 
‘judgement’ exhibits the so-called act-object ambiguity, denoting either the act of 
judging that something is true or the object which is judged as true (Honderich 1998). In 
the act sense, judgements are propositional attitudes, i.e. mental states or acts which 
have a variety of causes and effects, and vary from person to person and time to time. 
Judgements are distinguished from the sentences expressing them. In the object sense, 
judgements are propositions, i.e. abstract objects that are true or false, stand in logical 
relationships, and are composed of concepts or other judgements.  
 
The standard paradigm of learning has exerted a profound two-fold influence on the 
perceived place of judgement in education. First, where judgements have figured in 
educational concerns it has been as intellectual judgements, viewed as true or false 
propositions. These are very different from so-called practical judgements which are 
about what to do. Here, the influential sway of the pervasive theory versus practice 
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dichotomy is apparent. Second, by emphasizing judgement as outcome (object), rather 
than as process (act), the effect has been to diminish its significance, since education has 
always concentrated in a major way on true propositions. So overall, judgement has 
been taken for granted in education. Judgement as it occurs in workplace practice is 
banished to the category of ‘educationally uninteresting’. However, there is another 
significant view of learning that views judgement somewhat differently. 
 
The emerging paradigm of learning 
In contrast with the standards paradigm of learning, learning can be characterized  as 
action in the world.  Beckett and Hager (2002) refer to this alternative view as the 
‘emerging paradigm of learning’ because, though a diverse range of critical writings on 
education can be seen as pointing to this new paradigm, it is still a long way from 
gaining the wide recognition and support characteristic of an established paradigm. On 
this view, learning changes both learners and their environment. Since learners are part 
of that environment, the basic formulation is that the outcome of learning is to change 
the world in some way. Rather than being simply a change in the properties of the 
learner (as in the standard paradigm of learning), for the emerging paradigm, the main 
outcome of learning is the creation of a new set of relations in an environment. This is 
why learning is inherently contextual, since what it does is to continually alter the 
context in which it occurs. 
 
There are many writers who can be seen to be contributors to the emerging paradigm of 
learning. Beckett and Hager (2002) devote particular discussion to Dewey’s 
contribution. 
Dewey was a noted critic of dualisms, such as the mind/body dualism, and of spectator 
theories of knowledge. For Dewey, learning and knowledge were closely linked to 
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successful action in the world. While Dewey did not deny that concepts and 
propositions were important, he subsumed them into a wider capacity called judgement 
which incorporates, along with the cognitive, the ethical, aesthetic, conative and other 
factors that are omitted from the essentially cognitive standard paradigm of learning. It 
should be noted that Dewey is not totally discarding the explanatory items of the 
standard paradigm of learning. Rather they are part of his larger explanatory scheme. 
Thus, for him, the type of learning valorized by the standard paradigm is but a limited 
and special instance of a broader notion of learning. 
 
There has been a range of theorists who stress the crucial role of action in learning. This 
is an important idea for the emerging paradigm of learning. For example, Jarvis (1992) 
views learning that lacks this action component, such as contemplative learning, as 
abnormal learning. Jarvis upends the standard paradigm that privileges contemplative 
learning at the expense of all other kinds of learning. He holds the standard paradigm 
responsible for the phenomenon of people rejecting as learning what does not fit under 
its assumptions (the ‘denial of learning’ syndrome) (Jarvis 1992: 5). 
 
As noted earlier, one implication of the standard paradigm of learning is a sharp 
separation of the processes and products of learning. This distinction is plausible 
whenever learning is separated from action. However, when learning is closely linked 
with action, the two are not sharply distinguished at all. The process facilitates the 
product which at the same time enhances further processes and so on.  
  
A number of central ideas from Wittgenstein's later philosophy reinforce the emerging 
paradigm of learning (see, e.g. Williams 1994). These insights include an undermining 
of the assumption of the mental interiority of the best learning that is central to the 
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standard paradigm. For Wittgenstein, meanings are not essentially internal. Rather, 
meaning emerges from collective ‘forms of life’ (Toulmin 1999). As well, for 
Wittgenstein, the basic case of teaching (training) is not about mentalistic concepts 
being connected to objects (as in ostensive definition and rule following). Rather, it is 
about being trained into pattern-governed behaviours, i.e. learning to behave in ways 
that mimic activities licensed by practice or custom. Another important idea is the social 
basis of normative practices. 
 
Passmore argues that capacities are a major, perhaps the major, class of human learning. 
For Passmore in normal development ‘.... every human being acquires a number of 
capacities for action ..... whether as a result of experience, of imitation or of deliberate 
teaching....’ (1980: 37). His examples include, learning to walk, run, speak, feed and 
clothe oneself; in literate societies, learning to read, write, add; particular individuals 
learn to drive a car, play the piano, repair diesel engines, titrate, dissect, etc. 
 
Passmore stresses that not all human learning consists in capacities. As examples he 
instances development of tastes (e.g. for poetry), formation of habits (e.g. of quoting 
accurately), development of interests (e.g. in mathematics) and acquiring information. 
However, for Passmore each of these types of learning depends on capacities: to 
understand the language; to copy a sentence; to solve mathematical problems; to listen, 
read and observe. The argument is that capacities are the basis for other kinds of 
learning. So the mental enrichment seen as basic in the standard paradigm of learning 
actually depends on the exercise of learned capacities. 
 
That capacities are much more than mental in their scope is evident from their definition 
and characteristics  
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‘Capacity’ - A capacity is a power or ability (either natural or acquired) of a 
thing or person, and as such one of its real (because causally effective) 
properties. (Honderich 1998:119): 
Honderich characterizes natural capacities of inanimate objects, such as the capacity of 
copper to conduct electricity. These are dispositional properties whose ascription entails 
the truth of corresponding subjunctive conditionals. However, the capacities of persons, 
the exercise of which is subject to their voluntary control, such as a person's capacity to 
speak English, do not sustain such a pattern of entailments and are consequently not 
strictly dispositions. Thus capacities are vital features of human learning. 
 
Passmore further distinguishes two types of capacities ‘open’ and ‘closed’ as follows: 
Closed capacities: ‘A “closed” capacity is distinguished from an “open” capacity 
in virtue of the fact that it allows of total mastery.’ Examples include starting a 
car, holding a chisel correctly, etc. 
Open capacities: ‘In contrast, however good we are at exercising an “open” 
capacity, somebody else - or ourselves at some other time - could do it better’, 
e.g. playing the piano, novel writing, wood-carving. (1980: 40) 
 
The process/product distinction discussed above can be expounded further in relation to 
closed and open capacities. It is in the case of open capacities that the process/product 
distinction starts to blur. While the distinction remains fairly clear in the case of closed 
capacities (the process of starting a car can be readily distinguished from the 
achievement of the engine running. The latter is a state of affairs that obtains over and 
above the starting of the car (Ryle 1949), the same distinction is less clear in cases of 
open capacities. In playing the piano, for example, a state of affairs can be said to obtain 
of having played a particular piece, but the quality of this achievement can usually be 
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increased further by more playing, that is more process. So more of the process is the 
basis for the product being improved, yet at the same time such improvement will serve 
to enhance the performance of the process.  
 
As Passmore’s range of examples of capacities, e.g. titrating, dissecting, healing, etc., 
makes clear, their exercise often closely connects with the kind of judgement 
emphasized by Dewey. 
 
From this brief survey, the main principles of the emerging paradigm of learning are 
(Beckett and Hager 2002): 
• knowledge, as integrated in judgements, is a capacity for successful acting in and on 
the world;  
• the choice of how to act in and on the world comes from the exercise of judgement;  
• knowledge resides in individuals, teams and organizations; 
• knowledge includes not just propositional understanding, but cognitive, conative 
and affective capacities as well as other abilities and learned capacities such as 
bodily know-how, skills of all kinds, and so on. All of these are components 
conceivably involved in making and acting upon judgements; 
• not all knowledge can be or has been expressed verbally and written down; 
• acquisition of knowledge alters both the learner and the world (since the learner is 
part of the world). 
 
Clearly the notion of judgement is an important feature of the emerging paradigm of 
learning. This sits with its holistic, integrative emphasis that aims to avoid dualisms 
such as mind/body, theory/practice, thought/action, pure/applied, education/training, 
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intrinsic/instrumental, internal/external, learner/world, knowing that/knowing how, 
process/product, and so on. The argument is that judgements, as both reasoning and 
acting, incorporate both sides of these ubiquitous dualisms. Thus, this learning paradigm 
does not reject as such any pole of these dualisms. For instance there is no rejection of 
propositional knowledge. Rather, propositions are viewed as important sub-components 
of the mix that underpins judgements: though the range of such propositions extends 
well beyond the boundaries of disciplinary knowledge. What is rejected is the view that 
propositions are timeless, independent existents that are the epitome of knowledge. By 
bringing together the propositional with the doing, the emerging paradigm of learning 
continually judges propositions according to their contribution to the making of 
judgements. Because the judger is immersed in the world, so are propositions. So they 
lose their classical transcendental status. (For more details on judgement see Hager 
2000a, Hager 2000b, Beckett and Hager 2002). 
 
It can be proposed, therefore, that the emerging paradigm of learning is superior to the 
standard paradigm for conceptualizing learning at work. While the standard paradigm 
assumptions undermine attempts to understand what is happening in learning at work, 
the emerging paradigm offers concepts that provide a beginning of understanding. 
However, it should be emphasized that rather than the two paradigms of learning being 
polar opposites, the standard paradigm is best seen as a limited and special instance of 
the emerging paradigm. However the role of learning outside of formal classrooms is so 
vital in the contemporary era that we can no longer allow its understanding to be 
distorted by mistaking what is merely a limited and special case of learning for the 
norm.  
 
MEASUREMENT OF ATTAINMENT OF LEARNING AT WORK 
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The influence of the standard paradigm of learning on the formal education system has 
been such that assessment of student attainment has been largely shaped by its 
assumptions. In standard assessment and progression systems, learning is demonstrated 
by individuals reproducing verbal or written propositions in appropriate combinations in 
response to set questions in examinations and written assignments. Here, there is a focus 
on universal, context free knowledge, with numbers and grading to quantify the amount 
of learning demonstrated. While relatively simple skills might be tested by direct 
observation of candidates performing the skills, a common strategy with more complex 
skills is to have candidates answer written questions. For example, in Australia there is 
an attempt to measure generic attributes of new university graduates via multiple choice 
testing (Australian Council for Educational Research). Likewise in the United Kingdom 
there have been recent moves to assess students’ key skills by having them sit for 
written examinations (Fuller and Unwin 2001). In both cases, there has been significant 
scepticism about what, if anything, these tests are measuring. Certainly, it can be stated 
that they reflect both the assumptions and limitations of the approach to assessment 
favoured by the standard paradigm of learning. 
 
Assessment arrangements such as these reflect the standard paradigm of learning 
principles that the best learning resides in individual minds as propositions and, because 
of their transparency, these can be readily reproduced in verbal or written form. Skills of 
all kinds, while regarded as inferior types of learning, also have their place. Guided by 
the right propositional knowledge, they can be applied via bodies to alter the external 
world in desired ways. Unfortunately for proponents of this approach, its theoretical 
basis has long since been undermined (e.g. Ryle 1949). 
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From the preceding, it will be clear that the emerging paradigm of learning, with its 
focus on holism, judgement, action and context, better represents the kinds of learning 
that occur in workplaces. At best, the type of learning valorized by the standard 
paradigm is but a small part of learning in workplaces. Thus, when it comes to assessing 
learning at work, retaining the assessment assumptions of the standard paradigm will 
only serve to guarantee ineffective assessment. To see further why this is so, we need to 
consider more closely some key assessment assumptions of the standard paradigm of 
learning. 
 
The individuality assumption 
A virtually universal assessment assumption of the standard paradigm of learning is that 
the individual is the correct unit of analysis. This discounts the possibility, indeed the 
likelihood, of communal learning, i.e. learning by teams and organizations that may not 
be reducible to learning by individuals. Adopting the individuality assumption has wide-
ranging implications for vocational education, e.g. human capital theory incorporates 
this assumption. This is evident from a typical definition of human capital: ‘[T]he 
knowledge, skills and competences and other attributes embodied in individuals that are 
relevant to economic activity’ (OECD 1998: 9). 
 
The stability assumption 
Another key presupposition of the standard paradigm of learning is that the knowledge 
being assessed remains relatively stable over time. It needs this characteristic so that it 
can be incorporated into curricula and textbooks, be passed on from teachers to students, 
its attainment be measured in examinations, and the examination results for different 
teachers and different institutions be readily amenable to comparison. Thus formal 
education systems want to deal with assessment of learning that is stable, familiar and 
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widely understood. Engestrom puts this assumption of what he calls ‘standard theories 
of learning’ as follows: ‘a self-evident presupposition that the knowledge or skill to be 
acquired is itself stable and reasonably well-defined’ (Engestrom 2001: 137).  
 
The replicability assumption 
The practice of comparing assessment results for students across different class 
groupings and different institutions was found to involve the stability of knowledge 
assumption. In fact, the everyday practice of comparing the learning of different 
students also requires an even more fundamental presupposition, the replicability 
assumption. This assumption is that the learning of different learners can be literally the 
same or identical. The sorting and grading functions of education systems requires the 
possibility of this kind of foundational certainty of marks and grades. These matters are 
reflected in the common term used to denote replicability of learning - different students 
are said to have the same ‘attainment’. 
 
As several English dictionaries confirm, ‘to attain’ means 1. to arrive at, reach (a goal, 
etc.), or 2. to gain, accomplish (an aim, distinction, etc.). In either case, conscious 
development or effort is often involved. The noun ‘attainment’ has two distinct 
meanings reflecting the process/product distinction: 1. the act or an instance of 
attaining, or 2. something attained or achieved; an accomplishment. When applied to 
learning the verb to attain introduces metaphorical connotations - learners have arrived 
at or reached a place or gained an object. This is consistent with the Latin derivation 
from ‘attingere’ - to touch.  
 
The metaphors associated with attainment appear to fit very well with various aspects of 
the standard paradigm of learning. For a start they encompass the process/product 
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distinction. Attaining learning, stocking the mind with contents is akin to arriving at a 
goal or gaining an object. The learning that has been attained is akin to the mind having 
‘touched’ the relevant propositions. Recall that propositions are viewed as timeless, 
unchanging entities located in a world of ideas. Students with the same level of 
attainment can be thought of as mentally ‘touching’ the same range of universal 
propositions. Inside their individual minds each has completed the same mental journey, 
on the way calling at the prescribed places or destinations. 
 
The metaphors associated with attainment seem to fit much less well with the emerging 
paradigm of learning. Perhaps ‘attaining’ is a more suitable notion here. Also, with this 
paradigm, the process/product distinction is less applicable, reflecting that finished 
products of learning are not so readily identifiable. In workplaces, typical learning 
involves developing the gradually growing capacity to participate effectively in socially-
situated collaborative practices. This means being able to make holistic, context 
sensitive judgements about how to act in situations that may be more or less novel. As 
well, these judgements are often developed at the level of the team or the organization. 
So in these circumstances the propositions touched by individual minds may be of 
limited interest. It seems that each of the three key assessment assumptions of the 
standard paradigm breaks down when applied to workplace learning. The isolated 
individual is often not the appropriate unit of analysis. The learning is not stable as 
contexts continually change and evolve. In many occupations people with just the 
expertise of a decade ago are no longer employable. Much work requires practitioners to 
develop open capacities (in Passmore's sense) in an ongoing way. Nor will the learning 
histories of workers be the same because of the contextuality and particularities of their 
different work experiences. Hence it makes little sense to look for replicability of 
learning across individual workers. 
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Scheffler in a discussion of the centrality of metaphorical language in educational 
theory, noted that metaphors indicate, 
 
that there is an important analogy between two things, without saying explicitly 
in what the analogy consists. Now, every two things are analogous in some 
respect, but not every such respect is important.... the notion of importance 
varies with the situation..... (1960: 48) 
 
Scheffler added that every metaphor has limitations, ‘points at which the analogies it 
indicates break down’ (1960: 48). For dominant metaphors he suggested we need to 
determine their limitations, thereby ‘opening up fresh possibilities of thought and 
action.’ (Scheffler 1960: 49). My view is that the standard paradigm of learning, centred 
on the metaphor of the spectator mind, aloof from the world, steadily acquiring 
unchanging propositions, well illustrates Scheffler’s claims. A very limited form of 
learning has been allowed to determine how we picture all learning. While we can 
envisage that different minds, themselves not part of the everyday world, can all touch 
(attain) the same timeless, transparent propositions, important instances of learning, 
such as the learning by a team carrying out a challenging workplace project, are nothing 
like this. Yet, just such assumptions have been allowed to dominate our ideas on 
assessment of learning in general. 
 
As the above rejection of the attainment metaphor suggests, effective assessment of 
learning at work requires something of a paradigm shift in how we think about these 
matters (see Hager and Butler 1996). The judgemental model of assessment frightens 
people who want guaranteed foundations and the certainty that they think these bring. 
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The timeless propositions and logical essences of the standard paradigm of learning 
appear to provide just such foundations and certainty. Whereas the lack of stability and 
replicability for assessment under the judgemental model dashes any such hopes. 
However, it seems to be unavoidable that much learning at work belongs to a type of 
human practice that evades the standard paradigm. In such practices, it is simply the 
case that the practices are judged by standards which themselves evolve from the 
practices. We are stuck with a virtuous circle (or spiral) of practices and standards.  
 
A CASE HISTORY OF LEARNING FROM WORK  
To address further the differences between measuring learning at work and the 
assessment of learning that is characteristic in formal education systems, we will 
consider a case history of learning from work. The following case history probably 
represents an unusually rich instance of learning from work. However, if we  are to 
understand a phenomenon better, it is helpful to consider some of the best instances. 
 
Case history of a senior surveyor 
Richard is Survey Manager for the Infrastructure Operating Unit of a large construction 
group. He describes himself as a ‘hands-on’ man and still goes onto sites to do surveys 
when he can so as to keep himself in touch. His current responsibilities are the 
development and control of survey staff and equipment to ensure that the group remains 
an industry leader, and the planning of the future surveying needs of the construction 
group in terms of human and physical resources. Richard has been in surveying all his 
working life. Although not a registered surveyor, he has broad experience in major 
construction companies as project manager, foreman, project surveyor, senior surveyor 
and chief surveyor. In 1980 he was promoted to a managerial position with the specific 
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task of streamlining the use of software packages, survey equipment and lines of 
communication with surveyors on various jobs.  
 
A major influence on Richard’s career was the shock of ‘falling on his face’ at the end 
of schooling because he ‘spent his final year in the surf’. Being not eligible to go to 
university, Richard decided to become a surveyor and successfully completed a 4 year 
part-time Certificate in Surveying at a Technical and Further Education (TAFE) college, 
while working as a survey assistant. Failure of earlier university plans motivated him to 
do very well in the TAFE course. This brief case history focuses on the changes in 
surveying skills that Richard has encountered and on how he has acquired new skills to 
keep up with occupational change. 
 
Richard views construction surveying as a service industry, whose purpose is to 
formulate methods to set out a project and to calculate the relevant data and quantities. 
While this basic purpose has not changed, Richard has seen the way it is done change, 
and continue to change, dramatically, as technology has evolved. The scope and extent 
of the major revolution in surveying is reflected in a number comparisons.  First, when 
Richard started, he calculated survey data with log tables or small calculators averaging 
10-15 property blocks per day. Now with Global Positioning Systems (GPS) he does 
anything from 600-10,000 shots a day on site, with the calculations of the data 
happening in the office using sophisticated PC software. Second, Richard's first 
surveying calculator had a memory capacity of twenty-five programme steps; now he 
uses software that can deal with a million survey points. Third, early ‘modeling 
software’ of the 1980s ran overnight processing survey data. Now the same calculations 
require a few seconds. 
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Richard summarizes these enormous changes as follows. ‘Broadly speaking, there was 
the introduction of the computer, followed by an electronic survey equipment 
revolution, then a software revolution. Now all three are merged to control and drive 
sophisticated machines that in the future may not require an operator.’  
 
Essentially, Richard believes he has learnt his job skills, both technical and managerial, 
from experience on-the-job and his own personal research. He claims that, basically, 
there is no training for construction that can replace actual on-the-job experience. He 
sees his learning as being self-developed gradually over the course of his career, 
including gaining the knowledge and skills to perform in higher positions. Thus, for 
Richard, the role of formal training in his moves to higher level jobs has been largely 
negligible. 
 
The rapid computer innovations in a small field such as surveying are such that there are 
not a lot of worthwhile courses available. Richard works with the software writers to 
understand and assist in directing the latest innovations. For Richard and most software 
users they either pay for training or work it out for themselves. In doing the latter, 
Richard has become used to ‘pushing himself to the limits’. Survey equipment 
manufacturers run some training sessions and there are university workshops available 
from time to time. He is about to attend an intense 3-day workshop at a university on 
GPS. These workshops are the result of organizations combining to give a more 
structured training alternative to that of manufacturer organized sessions. He comments 
that this is better than manufacturers’ sessions as they feature more intensive learning. 
Another benefit is that you come away from these workshops with not only the course 




Richard compensates for the lack of suitable courses in these specialized areas through 
personal research. A common instance of self-teaching is venturing into the software to 
try out what it can do. If he makes a mistake, he just starts again. Richard keeps in touch 
with software package writers by conducting trials of their products and providing 
feedback and advice. He does the same with prototype survey instruments. He also 
belongs to a software user group made up of people from all sections of the industry. A 
software company technical support manager runs the group. Richard’s company pays 
for him to attend this user group, which discusses the problems experienced, the needed 
innovations or applications and the overall directions for the industry. He sees this as 
invaluable as no university or TAFE course can possibly keep pace with the speed and 
cost of the equipment being developed. This applies also to the use of survey 
instruments. 
 
There is no specific construction training in Australian degrees in surveying, but studies 
in surveying and civil engineering can be merged, which Richard sees as a logical 
combination of skills. Richard learnt and developed his skills on the job by working 
extremely long hours. Summarizing his development and maintenance of up-to-date 
technical surveying skills, Richard sees some of it coming from formal off-the-job 
learning, some of it coming from formal on-the-job learning, but by far the vast majority 
of it is from informal off-the-job reading, research and testing, that he does for himself. 
 
The other area where Richard has had to gain and maintain skills is as a manager. As 
with his technical surveying skills, Richard sees experience on-the-job as the significant 
source of his acquired management skills. He describes his management roles as 
centering on running smoothly operating teams, structured surveying methods and clear 
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company policies. His first experience of management evolved from frustration at the 
rather ad hoc surveying methods at the firm. He approached his manager with 
procedures to improve and streamlined survey methods for better efficiency. He was 
encouraged to implement his ideas and manage them. 
 
Until this job, Richard’s role as manager occurred at all hours of the day. This was 
because he had to provide site survey services to various large construction sites, using 
junior surveyors, and simultaneously assist surveyors at other sites all over New South 
Wales with methods and procedures, this latter invariably by telephone. The on site 
management was a ‘hands-on’ situation in which he could gather his team to show them 
something when needed, whereas the telephone assistance to other locations Richard 
believed to be restricted and difficult. Richard’s new management role is not tied to a 
site and allows him more time for face-to-face assistance, time to solve problems and 
provide solutions to sites and surveyors. Regular site visits also helps to maintain 
quality and motivation. This role structure also allows Richard time to assist with Head 
Office tenders and variations. 
 
Implications for learning from work 
Richard’s case history provides further strong evidence for the inapplicability of each of 
the three key basic assessment assumptions of the standard paradigm of learning to 
workplace learning. Although Richard’s case history describes the learning trajectory of 
an individual, he is certainly not, qua learner, an isolated individual. His proactive work 
with the software writers to understand and assist in development of innovative 
products, together with his membership of the software user group illustrate this. 
Accepting a mainstream definition of ‘learning’ (‘the acquisition of a form of 
knowledge or ability through the use of experience’ (Hamlyn in Honderich 1998: 476), 
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it is surely plausible that in such activities learning by teams and groups is likely and is 
not reducible to learning by individuals. If such communities as the software user group 
develop abilities that transcend the abilities of individual members, then the individual 
is not the appropriate unit of analysis for understanding this learning.  
 
Certainly much of Richard’s learning is not stable as the contexts in which he works 
change and evolve so rapidly. In some areas the rapid change means that cutting edge 
formal courses are an impossibility. Nor is Richard’s learning trajectory one that can be 
replicated by others. The contextuality and particularities of his learning from work 
experiences impart uniqueness to that learning. Others might have an equally rich 
learning trajectory, but it will still be a very different one from Richard’s. Richard was 
‘headhunted’ for his current position on the basis of holistic judgements made by others 
about the quality of his work performance; not because he outperformed other 
individuals on standard assessment tasks. 
 
Richard’s responsibility for planning the future surveying needs, both human and 
physical resources, of his company requires continual learning for him to make wise 
judgements, e.g. which equipment to buy and which to lease. In a field undergoing such 
rapid and continuing change, Richard depends very much on his ongoing learning to 
keep him well-informed. There are no textbooks to tell him what to do. His continuous 
learning underpins the series of integrated judgements that his job requires him to make 
to ensure that his construction company continues to act successfully in and on the 
world. 
 
It appears that Richard’s motivation for learning is multi-facetted. From the time of his 
youth he preferred learning from real work to academic learning. His failure to qualify 
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for entry to university seems to have motivated him more strongly to learn from work. 
He creates and drives his own learning opportunities, sometimes ‘pushing himself to the 
limits’. He also enjoys strong support from his employer, who pays for him to attend the 
software users’ group. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that the most influential conceptualisation of learning, one that 
has decisively shaped teaching and assessment practices in formal education systems, is 
very problematic when it comes to understanding learning at work. Nor is the standard 
assessment concept of ‘attainment’ very helpful for thinking about what is learned 
atwork. Three basic assumptions have been identified as underpinning common 
understandings of learning and its assessment. Firstly, that individuals are the locus of 
learning, secondly, that what is learnt is stable over time, and thirdly, that learning 
trajectories are common across learners. It has been shown that learning at work 
challenges each of these assumptions, thereby casting doubt on their importance for our 
understanding of learning. Instead this chapter has drawn on various authors to outline 
an alternative conceptualisation of learning, one that provides a better fit with learning 
at work. The value of the alternative conceptualization of learning has been illustrated 
by testing it against salient points of a case history of learning at work in a rapidly 
changing field, viz. surveying. This illustrated how various contextual factors make 
learning at work difficult to fit into standard ways of conceptualizing learning and 
assessment. The case history also pointed to some factors that can contribute to 
improving learning at work. Overall, further research is needed to expand our 
understanding of learning from work and the most appropriate ways of measuring its 
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